Cipriano P. Primicias vs. Felicisimo Ocampo

G.R. No. L-6120, June 30, 1953; per Bautista Angelo, J.

Facts

Petitioner filed a motion praying that assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure."

The court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed, that the Supreme Court, having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be deemed as a mere surplusage.

Petitioner is now imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge and further seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of two criminal cases without the assistance of assessors in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409.

Issue

Whether or not the right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of

assessors is a substantive right impaired by the courts in the exercise of its rule-making power

Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that trial with the aid of assessors are parts of substantive law and are not embraced by its rule-making power. Being substantive in nature, it is not difficult to see why the provisions concerning trial by assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure have not been incorporated by the Supreme Court in the present Rules of Court. Such would have been a travesty of its rule-making power which, by direct mandate of the Constitution, is limited to matters referring to pleading, practice and procedure.